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Abstract
In this methodological paper we prove that the key tax competition
game introduced by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wildasin
(1988), extended to asymmetric regions, possesses a Nash equilibrium
under several assumptions commonly adopted in the literature: goods
are supposed to be normal; the public good is assumed to be a desired
good; the demand for capital is concave; and the elasticity of the
marginal product is bounded. The general framework we develop
enables us to obtain very tractable results. By applying our method
to several examples with standard production functions, we show that
it is easy to use.
Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Tax Competition.
JEL Classication: C72, H21, H42, R50
Résumé
Dans cet article méthodologique, nous déterminons les conditions
su¢ santes à lexistence dun équilibre de Nash dans le modèle de con-
currence scale développé Zodrow andMieszkowski (1986) etWildasin
(1988) et généralisé au cas de régions asymétriques : les biens sont
supposés normaux, le bien public est un bien « désiré » , le demande
de capital est concave ; et lélasticité de la production marginale est
bornée. Le cadre général que nous développons permet dobtenir des
résultats facilement exploitables. Lapplication de notre méthode à
plusieurs fonctions de production usuellement utilisées dans la littéra-
ture économique montre quelle permet de vérier aisément lexistence
de léquilibre de Nash dans le jeu de concurrence scale.
Mots-clef: Equilibre de Nash, Concurrence scale.
Classication JEL : C72, H21, H42, R50
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1 Introduction
In the established literature on tax competition the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium is assumed (see Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1985, 1986) and
Wildasin (1988)). These studies focus on the comparative statics of Nash equilib-
ria, and demonstrate that public services are provided at ine¢ ciently low levels
in equilibrium. However, a little attention has been devoted to the question of
whether such equilibria do exist. This is for the most part because the demon-
stration is very di¢ cult, as noted by Laussel and Le Breton (1998): "Both the
existence and uniqueness issues are di¢ cult in general and have not been up to
now dealt with in the literature. It seems however of primary interest to solve
them in order to understand the comparative statics of the equilibrium." Interest-
ingly, an example developed by Iritani and Fujii (2002) showed that there exists
at least one pair of utility and production functions for which no Nash equilibrium
exists in the Zodrow-Mieszkowski framework. This case emphasizes the impor-
tance of examinating whether such an equilibrium exists in a tax competition
game.
Some results have already been established in the literature for particular
cases. Firstly, Bucovetsky (1991) demonstrated the existence of a Nash equilib-
rium in tax rates in the case of two regions and quadratic production functions.
A second and important result was highlighted by Laussel and Le Breton (1998)
who proved the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium when private and
public goods are perfect substitutes and when capital is not owned by residents.
In addition, this framework enables the authors to prove the uniqueness of the
equilibrium, which is the primacy purpose of their paper. In a more recent paper,
Bayindir-Upman and Ziad (2005) apply a weaker concept than the standard Nash
equilibrium  the concept of a second-order locally consistent equilibrium (2
LCE)  which is a local Nash equilibrium (i.e., a small deviation is undesirable).
With this tool, the authors are able to show both the existence and uniqueness
of a symmetric equilibrium in tax rates when regions are homogeneous and when
either (i) there are only two regions, (ii) capital demand curves are concave, or
rms apply (iii) CES, (iv) CobbDouglas, or (v) logistic production functions.
More recently, Dhillon, Wooders and Zissimos (2006) investigate the existence of
a Nash equilibrium in a symmetric tax competition model where the public good
enters the production function. Rothstein (2007) analyses the scal competition
game as a game with discontinuous payo¤ and demonstrates the existence of a
pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this kind of game under several assumptions
respecting the production function. Rothstein moves away from the standard s-
cal competition game à la Wildasinby assuming: rst an ad valorem tax; and
second that the aggregate amount of mobile capital is xed in all regions. Finally,
Petchey and Shapiro (2009) examine the problem of the existence of Nash equi-
librium in a tax competition model when governments are no longer benevolent
but only make constrained e¢ cient choices.
A key point of this paper is that we deal with asymmetric regions. The liter-
3 
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ature on asymmetric tax competition is mainly based on two articles by Wilson
(1991) and Bucovetsky (1991). Both assume that regions di¤er in their popula-
tion and show that the "small" region may benet from the tax competition by
attracting capital from the "large" region thanks to the tax competition mech-
anism. In the present paper, we retain the methodological question regarding
the existence of Nash equilibrium in the tax competition model "à la Wildasin"
that we extend to regions that di¤er by their production functions. In doing so,
we extend the existing literature by proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium
in a more general framework. Our paper is in line with Laussel and Le Breton
(1998) and Bayindir-Upman and Ziad (2005), but we basically depart from their
analysis by relaxing the assumption of symmetry. We also depart from the paper
by Rothstein rstly by considering proportional taxes, whereas Rothstein uses an
ad valorem tax, secondly, by establishing a weaker condition of existence than
the quasiconcavity condition of Rothstein, and thirdly, by deriving directly our
result in the tax competition model. To prove our results, we use several assump-
tions: that goods are normal; that the public good is desired; that the demand
for capital is concave; and that the elasticity of the marginal product of capital
is bounded.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section outlines the tax
competition model for a given number of regions, notation and description of the
model being taken for the most part from Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (2005).
Section 3 studies the existence of the Nash equilibrium, rst when there are no
holders of capital in the jurisdictions, and second, when residents do hold capital.
The nal Section summarizes our conclusions.
2 The Model
Consider n (n  2) jurisdictions inhabited by a given number of homogeneous
residents that we normalize to one without loss of generality. A xed number
of competitive rms produce a homogeneous output in each jurisdiction using
capital and some xed factor(s) (land or labour). Aggregating production over
all rms in each region allows us to treat the industry of one jurisdiction as one
competitive rm. Let fi be the production function of the rm in jurisdiction i,
fi is assumed to be monotonously increasing and strictly concave in capital, Ki.
Fixed factors as explicit arguments of fi are suppressed so that the production
function is expressed in terms of capital only. The jurisdiction i rms prot can
be written as
i = fi(Ki)  piKi; i = 1; : : : ; n (1)
where pi denotes the after-tax price of capital in jurisdiction i. Equating the price
of capital to the value of its marginal product, f 0i(Ki) = pi determines the region
is capital demand as a function of the corresponding after-tax price of capital,
K^i(pi).
4 
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Let U (Xi; Pi) be the utility that the representative household of jurisdiction
i derives from the provision of the public good, Pi, and from the consumption of
the private good, Xi, produced by the rms. The utility function U (Xi; Pi) is
twice-continuously di¤erentiable and monotonously increasing. The source of the
households income is twofold: one part from the provision of the xed factor,
which is exclusively owned by local residents; and one part from their initial
capital endowment. Let i 2 [0; 1] denote region is share of the xed national
capital stock K, and , the net return of capital in region i: The private budget
constraint of the consumer in region i amounts to
Xi = fi(Ki)  piKi + ii K (2)
for each jurisdiction i = 1; : : : ; n.
Each local government provides a public good that it nances by taxing the
mobile capital at a tax rate ti. The budget constraint of jurisdiction i is given by
Pi = tiKi (3)
When choosing the level of the tax rate, each local government acts as a benev-
olent one and aims to maximize its representative residents utility. In doing
so, each local authority behaves non-cooperatively and treats its specic tax on
capital ti, i = 1; : : : ; n, as the strategic variable. This leads to a tax competition
game between jurisdictions.
The capital market clearing condition implies that aggregate demand for
capital must equal capital supply:
nX
i=1
Ki = K; (4)
for some exogenously given capital supply K.
Capital being freely mobile across regions, the arbitrage condition equals the
net return of capital in each jurisdiction:
 = f 0i(Ki)  ti (= i) ; 8i = 1; : : : ; n: (5)
Let t := (t1; : : : ; tn) be the prole of tax rates, t i := (t1; : : : ; ti i; ti+1; : : : ; tn)
be the prole of all tax rates except ti; whereas (t i; t0i ) stands for
(t1; : : : ; ti 1; t0i ; ti+1; : : : ; tn). Both equations (4) and (5) dene the equilib-
rium allocation of capital and the equilibrium of the net return of capital, i.e.
K1(t); : : : ; Kn(t) and (t).
The capital market equilibrium enables us to determine the response of the
net return of capital to an increase in jurisdiction is tax rate:
@(t)
@tj
=   K^
0
j(pj)P
i K^
0
i(pi)
:
5 
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and since each regions capital demand monotonously decreases with the price
of capital

K^ 0j(pj) =
1
fjkk
< 0

, we have @(t)
@tj
2 ( 1; 0), which is equivalent to
1 + @(t)
@tj

2 (0; 1)1.
Di¤erentiating Kj(t) and Ki(t) with respect to tj, we obtain the overall
impact of a variation of the tax rate of region j on capital demand:
@Kj(t)
@tj
= K^ 0j(pj)

1 +
@(t)
@tj

< 0 ;
@Ki(t)
@tj
= K^ 0i(pi)
@(t)
@tj
> 0; 8i 6= j ;
with pj = (t) + tj; 8j.
Using pi =  + ti and substituting Ki(t) and (t) into the private and the
public budget constraint (2) and (3), we obtain
Xi(t) = fi(Ki(t))  (ti+(t))Ki(t) + i K(t); (6)
Pi(t) = tiKi(t) : (7)
Di¤erentiating equations (6) and (7) with respect to ti2 yields:
@Xi
@ti
=  Ki

1 +
@
@ti

+ i K
@
@ti
< 0 ; (8)
@2Xi
@t2i
=  @Ki
@ti

1 +
@
@ti

   Ki   i K @2
@t2i
; (9)
@Xi
@tj
=
 
i K  Ki
 @
@tj
8i 6= j; (10)
@Pi
@ti
= Ki +
@Ki
@ti
ti ; (11)
@2Pi
@t2i
= 2
@Ki
@ti
+ ti
@2Ki
@t2i
; (12)
@Pi
@tj
= tiK^
0
i
@
@tj
> 0 8i 6= j; (13)
Equation (8) states that the private good is clearly decreasing with the local tax
rate whereas nothing can be said about the reaction of the public good. Both
equations (6) and (7) enable us to write an indirect utility function Vi(t) :=
Ui(Xi(t); Pi(t)), which directly relates tax policy to welfare. Maximizing the
indirect utility function of jurisdiction i with respect to the tax rate ti yields the
following rst-order condition:
@Vi(t)
@ti
=
@Ui
@Xi
@Xi
@ti
(t) +
@Ui
@Pi
@Pi
@ti
(t) = 0;
1These expressions are perfectly in line with the standard results of the tax competition
litterature such as Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) for instance.
2Note that all functions are continuously di¤erentiable with respect to the strategic variables.
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which implies the relation
@U i=@Pi
@U i=@Xi
=
 @Xi=@ti
@Pi=@ti
and by equations (8) and (11) we have:
MRSXi;Pi :=
@U i=@Pi
@U i=@Xi
=
Ki +
 
Ki   i K

@
@ti
Ki +

1 + @
@ti

tiK^ 0i
=
 @Xi=@ti
@Pi=@ti
= MRFTXi;Pi
(14)
In what follows, we are interested in the existence of a Nash equilibrium, a
prole of strategies t such that ti maximizes Vi(ti; t

 i) with respect to ti for each
i.
3 The Existence of Nash Equilibrium
3.1 Absentee holders of capital
In this section we assume that i = 0 or is su¢ ciently small for each i, which is in
line with Wildasin (1988). As explained by Laussel and Le Breton (1995), there
is a dual interpretation of this assumption: one for a partial equilibrium model,
and one for a general equilibrium model. In the partial equilibrium model, i = 0
means that capital is owned by agents outside the jurisdictions under considera-
tion; in a general equilibrium model, even if all capital is located in the "nation",
a majority of residents do not hold capital, and through the median voter argu-
ment, it can be simply stated that each variable is chosen to maximize the welfare
of the residents who do not own capital (see Laussel and Le Breton (p285)). In
this article we choose the partial equilibrium interpretation. In the following, we
also assume that the net return is positive (  0)3, which immediately implies
ti  f ik(Ki(t1; : : : ; tn)) for each ti: f ik being a decreasing function of ti, and that
we also have ti  f ik(0). At this stage f ik(0) may be nite or not.
So that we might obtain useful and clear results, we postulate the following
assumptions:
(C1): For each i and for all Xi > 0, MRSXi;0  1.
(C2): For each i and for all Xi; Pi > 0: @@XiMRSXi;Pi  0 and @@PiMRSXi;Pi  0.
(C3): The third derivative of the production functions is positive, f ikkk > 0 for
each i.
3This assumption is commonly used in the literature (cf Bucovetsky (1991), Laussel and
Lebreton (1995)), and logically implies that "capital owners cannot be forced to supply capital
services at a loss" (Bucovetsky 1991, p171).
7 
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(C4): For each i we have f ik(f
i
kk +Kif
i
kkk) < Ki (f
i
kk)
2.
(C5): Let K := K=n. For each i, MRS
i
fi(K) Kf 0i(K);Kf 0i(K) 
h
1 + n 1
n
1
ik
i 1
, where
ik is the elasticity of the marginal product of capital.
Condition (C1) stipulates that the public good is a desirable good and guar-
antees that jurisdictions will never select ti = 0 as an optimal solution4. As
we need the strategies subsets to be a convex compact of IR, we assume that
there exists a bound t such that ti  t for each i. Both Bucovetsky (1991) and
Bayindir-Upmann & Ziad (2005) also use this condition. Condition (C2); already
postulated by Bucovetsky (1991) and Bayindir-Upmann & Ziad (2005), requires
that the marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good
is non-decreasing in the rst argument and non-increasing in the second argu-
ment. This is equivalent to state that both the private and the public good are
normal goods, which is regarded as standard in economics. Condition (C3) was
rst introduced by Laussel and Le Breton (1998) and later used by Rothstein
(2007) and Shapiro and Petchey (2009). It stipulates that the marginal product
of capital is always a convex function of the amount of invested capital. Usual
production functions such as Cobb-Douglass, CES and Quadratic functions sat-
isfy (C3). Laussel and Le Breton interpret this condition by stating that "for
a jurisdiction the advantage of taxing capital is in the induced reduction of the
equilibrium net rate of return of capital (i.e. of the equilibrium "price of capital"
which must be paid to capital holders who invest in the jurisdiction)". Condition
(C4) is a knew condition that can be rewritten as ik < 1 +
Kif
i
kkk
f ikk
where ik is
the elasticity of the marginal product of capital,

Kif
i
kk
f ik

. This condition states
that the elasticity of the marginal product of capital cannot exceed some bound.
Most of the standard production functions satisfy (C4) (see examples latter).
This condition is looser than conditions introduced by Rothstein (2007) who rst
assumes that the elasticity of the marginal product of capital ik must be higher
than ( 1) (assumption 8ii), and secondly, that 2 (f ikk)2  f ikf ikkk > 0 (assumption
9iii). Finally, (C5) was introduced in Bayindir-Upmann & Ziad (2005) and states
that when the capital is evenly distributed across regions and its return is fully
taxed away, the resulting tax revenue is su¢ cient to provide a level of the public
good which is, at least, close to the e¢ cient level at which the MRS = 1. With
condition (C1), (C5) guarantees the existence of a symmetric prole (ti = tj for
each i; j) such that in the symmetric case (fi = fj) the rst derivative of each
jurisdiction disappears (see Lemma 7 below).
In order to prove the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium, we consider
the best response of each jurisdiction and prove that they are functions and not a
4The derivative @Vi@ti evaluated at ti = 0, is proportional to
@Xi
@ti
+ MRSXi;0
@Pi
@ti
=
Ki(MRSXi;0   (1 + @(t)@ti )). According to

1 + @(t)@ti

2 (0; 1), condition (C1) ensures that
@Vi
@ti
(0; t i) > 0.
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correspondence. Then by continuity assumptions we can use a xed point theorem
to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium. Let t i := (t1; : : : ; ti i; ti+1; : : : ; tn)
be the prole of all tax rates except ti, our rst step is to look at the best response
function of jurisdiction i. If the rst order strategy is never satised, then the
best response is unique (every continuous function reaches it maximum value on a
compact subset) and the maximum is on the boundary. If the rst order strategy
is satised for some ti, we have to consider the second derivative and prove that
it is (at least locally) negative. Therefore we assume in the following that the
rst order strategy exists.
The principal general result of the paper is as follows:
Theorem 1 When consumerspreferences are represented by twice-continuously
di¤erentiable, monotonously increasing utility functions Ui(:; :) in (Xi; Pi) and as-
sumptions (C1), (C2), (C3) and (C4) then the asymmetrical scal game possesses
a Nash equilibrium.
To prove our result, we have to introduce several Lemmas, which are of
great importance in understanding the tax competition mechanisms at work in
the economy.
Lemma 1 [Capital Allocation]
For any given t, the capital allocation K1(t); : : : ; Kn(t) and the net return of
capital (t) are unique, with @Ki(t)
@ti
< 0, @Kj(t)
@ti
> 0 8j 6= i, and @(t)
@ti
< 0 8i.
Lemma 2 [Increasing branch of the La¤er curve]
For any given tax vector t i, a utility local-maximizing (respectively local mini-
mizing) strategy of region i requires @Pi
@ti
(t) > 0 on the left (respectively the right)
of any local extremum point.
Proof: As the private good Xi is a decreasing function in ti, and the utility
function Ui(:; :) is an increasing function in (Xi; Pi), in the neighborhood of any
local maximum (resp. minimum) 5 t0i , the public good must be an increasing
function on the left (respectively on the right) of t0i :
Lemma 3 [Decreasing marginal rate of substitution] Let condition (C2) hold.
For any tax vector t, the marginal rate of substitution between the private and the
public good is falling on the left or on the right of any local extremum.
Proof: The derivative of the marginal rate of substitution is
@
@ti
MRSXi;Pi(t) =
@MRSXi;Pi
@Xi
@Xi(t)
@ti
+
@MRSXi;Pi
@Pi
@Pi(t)
@ti
:
5Not on the boundary.
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From condition (C2) (goods are normal) we have @@XiMRSXi;Pi  0 and
@
@Pi
MRSXi;Pi  0. Since @Xi(t)@ti < 0 and
@Pi(t)
@ti
> 0 (lemma 2), then
@
@ti
MRSXi;Pi(t) < 0 :
Lemma 4 [Convexity of the net return to capital function]
Condition C3 is su¢ cient to ensure the convexity of the net return of capital (t).
Proof: The second derivative of the net return function is written as:
@2(t)
@t2i
=
@Ki(t)
@ti
f ikkk
(f ikk)
2
P
j
1
fjkk
  1
f ikk
P
j
@Kj(t)
@ti
fjkkk
(fjkk)
2P
j
1
fjkk
2 :
But (t) = f jk(Kj)  tj, then for j 6= i, we have @(t)@ti =
@Kj(t)
@ti
f jkk(Kj). We obtain
@2(t)
@t2i
=
@Ki(t)
@ti
f ikkk
(f ikk)
2
P
j
1
fjkk
  1
f ikk
P
j 6=i
@(t)
@ti
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3
 
@Ki(t)
@ti
f ikkk
(f ikk)
3P
j
1
fjkk
2
and
@2(t)
@ti
=

1 + @(t)
@ti

f ikkk
(f ikk)
3
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
  @(t)
@ti
1
f ikk
P
j 6=i
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3P
j
1
fjkk
2
which is positive as soon as f jkkk > 0 (condition C3) :
Lemma 5 [Second derivative of capital function]
The second derivative of capital is given by:
@2Ki(t)
@t2i
=
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
:f ikkk + f
i
kk
P
j 6=i
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3
  f ikkkf ikk
P
j
1
fjkk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
P
j
1
fjkk
3
:(f ikk)
4
:
Proof : See Appendix 1.
Lemma 1 to 4 enable us to establish the Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1: The set of rst and second order strategies of government
i are:
@V (t i; t0i )
@ti
=
@U(Xi; Pi)
@Xi
@Pi(t i; t0i )
@ti
"
@Xi
@ti
(t i; t0i )
@Pi
@ti
(t i; t0i )
+MRSXi;Pi(t i; t
0
i )
#
= 0 :
10 
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@V (t i; t0i )
@ti
=
@U(Xi; Pi)
@Xi
@Pi(t i; t0i )
@ti
 MRFTXi;Pi(t i; t0i ) +MRSXi;Pi(t i; t0i ) = 0 :
And
@2V (t i; t0i )
@t2i
=
@U(Xi; Pi)
@Xi
@Pi(t i; t0i )
@ti

  @
@ti
MRFTXi;Pi(t i; t
0
i ) +
@
@ti
MRSXi;Pi(t i; t
0
i )

;
From Lemma 3:
@
@ti
MRSXi;Pi(t i; t
0
i ) < 0:
We have to prove that
  @
@ti
MRFTXi;Pi(t i; t
0
i ) < 0:
Let
@
@ti
 
@Xi
@ti
(t0)
@Pi
@ti
(t0)
!
=

@Pi
@ti
 2 
@2Xi
@t2i
@Pi
@ti
  @Xi
@ti
@2Pi
@t2i

Then
@2Xi
@t2i
@Pi
@ti
 @Xi
@ti
@2Pi
@t2i
=  t

@Ki
@ti
3
f ikk K2i
@2
@t2i
 tKi@
2
@t2i
@Ki
@ti
+Ki

@Ki
@ti
2
f ikk+tKi
@Ki
@ti
@2Ki
@t2i
f ikk:
Replacing
@Ki(t)
@ti
=

1 + @(t)
@ti

f ikk
and
@2Ki(t)
@t2i
=

@2(t)
@t2i

(f ikk)
2  

1 + @(t)
@ti
2
f ikkk
(f ikk)
3
we get
@2Xi
@t2i
@Pi
@ti
 @Xi
@ti
@2Pi
@t2i
=
 ti(f ikk +Kif ikkk)

1 + @(t)
@ti
3
+Ki(f
i
kk)
2

1 + @(t)
@ti
2
 Kif ikk @
2
@t2i

(f ikk)
3
:
Then
@2Xi
@t2i
@Pi
@ti
  @Xi
@ti
@2Pi
@t2i
is negative if and only if
ti(f
i
kk +Kif
i
kkk)

1 +
@(t)
@ti
3
< Ki(f
i
kk)
2
 
1 +
@(t)
@ti
2
 Kif ikk
@2
@t2i
!
(15)
With f ikk < 0, f
i
kkk > 0 from C3 and
@2
@t2i
> 0 from Lemma 4.
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 If f ikk +Kif ikkk < 0, (15) is always satised
 If f ikk +Kif ikkk  0; using ti  f ik(Ki), a su¢ cient condition to check (15) is
then
f ik(f
i
kk +Kif
i
kkk)

1 +
@(t)
@ti
3
< Ki(f
i
kk)
2
 
1 +
@(t)
@ti
2
 Kif ikk
@2
@t2i
!
;
f ik
Kif ikk
(f ikk +Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk

1 +
@(t)
@ti
3
<
 
1 +
@(t)
@ti
2
 Kif ikk
@2
@t2i
!
;
(16)
As f
i
k
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
 1 by condition (C4),

1 + @(t)
@ti
3
<

1 + @(t)
@ti
2
and
@2
@t2i
> 0 by Lemma 4, we get the result. 
Let summarize the role of the di¤erent conditions in the proof: (C1) implies
that the set of strategies is a convex closed interval and condition (C2) implies
that the marginal rate of substitution between the private and the public good is
a non increasing function of the tax rate. Finally, both conditions (C3) and (C4)
insures that the marginal rate of the scal transformation between the private
and the public good is increasing with the tax rate. We crucially depart from the
Rothsteins result by several aspects: rstly, we stipulate a weaker condition than
those dened in Assumption 8 and 9 of Rothsteins paper, secondly, our proof is
direct while Rothsteins proof is much more complicated and uses Renys (1999)
result, and, lastly, we consider proportional taxes whereas Rothstein uses an ad
valorem tax.
3.1.1 Examples
In this Section, we introduce several examples so that we can check the tractability
of our result with commonly-used production functions:
Remark 1 For a Cobb-Douglass production function f(K) = K, we have
fk(K) = K
 1; fkk(K) = (  1)K 2; fkkk(K) = (  1)(  2)K 3 > 0;
and nally, f
i
k
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
= 1:
For a Quadratic production function f (K) = (a   bK)K, with K <
a
2b
we have fk(K) = a   2bK; fkk(K) =  2b; fkkk(K) = 0; and nally,
f ik
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
= a 2bK 2bK < 0:
For a logarithm function f(K) = ln (1 + K) ; we have fk(K) =

1+K
,
fkk(K) =   2(1+K)2 , and fkkk(K) = 2
3
(1+K)3
> 0. In addition, f
i
k
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
=
1  1
K
< 1.
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For an exponential function f(K) = 1   exp ( K) ; we have fk(K) =
 exp ( K), fkk(K) =  2 exp ( K), and fkkk(K) = 3 exp ( K) > 0.
We also have f
i
k
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
= 1  1
K
< 1.
All the production functions presented above satisfy C3 and C4:
Then for Cobb-Douglass, Quadratic, Logarithmic and Exponential production
functions, Nash equilibrium exists under conditions C1 and C2 (from Theorem 1)
even with asymmetries in technology. For instance, production functions can
write K1 ; K2 ; : : : ; Kn respectively with i 6= j for each i 6= j.
Remark 2 For a Logistic production function f(K) = 1
1+e x   12 , with x =
x(K) := KR, then fk(K) = R
ex
(1+ex)2
> 0, fkk(K) =
R2(1 ex)ex
(1+ex)3
and fkkk(K) =
R3(1 4ex+e2x)ex
(1+ex)4
> 0() x > ln[2 +p3].
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
=
(1+ex)(1 ex)+x(1 4ex+e2x)
(1+ex)(1 ex) where g(x) := x (1  4ex + e2x) +
(1 + ex) (1  ex) is non positive since g(0) = 0 and g0k(x) = (1 e2x) (4+2x)ex <
0. Therefore f ikk + Kif
i
kkk < 0 and the marginal rate of scal transformation is
increasing.
For a logistic production function with x > ln[2 +
p
3], Theorem 1 ensures
that a Nash equilibrium exists under conditions C1 and C2.
Remark 3 For a CES production function f(K) =
 
K + (1 )R  1 where
r stands for the quantity of the xed factor, 0 <  < 1,   1 and  6= 0; we
have fk(K) = K
 
K +(1 )R 
f(K)
K
, fkk(K) =  (1 )(1  ) (KR) (K +(1 )R )2 f(K)K2 , and fkkk(K) =
(1 )(1  ) (KR) 
(K +(1 )R )3
f(K)
K3
 
(1+ )K + (1 )(2  )R  > 0. In addition, f ik(f ikk +
Kif
i
kkk) Ki (f ikk)2 =  K
 
(1 )R +K , which implies f
i
k(f
i
kk+Kif
i
kkk) Ki (f ikk)2 < 0
for  < 0 and f ik(f
i
kk +Kif
i
kkk)  Ki (f ikk)2 > 0 for  > 0. In the last case, the
su¢ cient condition of theorem 1 is not satised. However a closer examination
of inequality (15) in the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the term f
i
k
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
may be higher than 1 and still respect (15). This is the case for some su¢ ciently
low values for  or for  , for instance.
As a corollary of Remarks 2, 3 and 4, we have
Corollary 1 Assume that consumers preferences are represented by twice-
continuously di¤erentiable, monotonously increasing utility functions Ui(:; :) in
(Xi; Pi) and that conditions (C1), and (C2) are satised. If for each jurisdiction
i, the production function fi 2 {Cobb-Douglass, Quadratic, Logarithmic, Expo-
nential, Logistic, CES} under further conditions for the parameters for the logistic
and CES production functions, then the scal game possesses a Nash equilibrium.
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3.1.2 Symmetric Jurisdictions
So that our results might be more comparable to those of Wildasin (1988), Bu-
covetsky (1991) and Laussel and Le Breton (1998), we now study the particular
case of symmetric jurisdictions (fi = fj = f).
Lemma 6 [Convex capital demand function in the symmetric case] Assume ho-
mogeneous jurisdictions and let condition C3 hold, then
@2Ki(t)
@t2i
is positive when
n  3 and vanishes for n = 2.
Proof : The sign of @
2Ki(t)
@t2i
is the opposite of X
j 6=i
1
f jkk
!2
:f ikkk + f
i
kk
X
j 6=i
f jkkk
(f jkk)
3
  f ikkkf ikk
 X
j
1
f jkk
! X
j 6=i
1
f jkk
!2
(17)
The rst two terms are positive under condition C3 (f ikkk > 0) while the last term
is negative. In the symmetric case (fi = fj = f), expression (17) evaluated at
the diagonal becomes:
(n  1)2
f 2kk
fkkk + fkk
(n  1)fkkk
(fkk)3
  fkkkfkk n
fkk
(n  1)2
f 2kk
=
(n  1)2fkkk + (n  1)fkkk   n(n  1)2fkkk
f 2kk
=
n(n  1)(2  n)fkkk
f 2kk
Which is clearly negative for n  3 and null for n = 2 :
Lemma 7 [Existence of an extremum along the diagonal] Assume homogeneous
jurisdictions and let conditions (C1) and (C5) hold. Along the diagonal (ti =
tj, for each i) each regions payo¤ function Vi reaches an extremum at some
symmetric tax vector 0 < t0 < f 0( K=n) = tM .
Proof: See Bayindir-Upman and Ziad (2005) p21.
Corollary 2 In the symmetric scal competition game, assume that conditions
(C1), (C2) and (C5) hold.
1. If n = 2, or
14 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2010.37
2. If n  3 and the production functions satisfy the following inequality
f ik
Kif ikk
(f ikk +Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
<

n
n  1
0@1  Kif ikkkf ikk
n  1
1A (18)
for each i and each ti,
Then a local Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof: See Appendix 2
Note that the case n = 2 corresponds to the Laussel and Le Bre-
tons framework and that condition (18) is less restrictive than condition C4
f ik
Kif ikk
(f ikk+Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk
< 1

since
 
n
n 1
0@1  Kifikkkfikk
n 1
1A > 1.
3.2 Residents hold capital
In this section we relax the assumption of absentee capital owners and we consider
i 6= 0. Even if our conclusions are not obvious, we are able to state several results
and intuitions:
Remark 4 When residents hold capital, condition (15) which ensures the concav-
ity of the indirect utility function and then the existence of the Nash equilibrium,
writes:
f ik
Kif ikk
(f ikk +Kif
i
kkk)
f ikk

1 +
@(t)
@ti
3
<
1 +
@(t)
@ti
2
 

(Ki   i K)f ikk  
tii K
Ki
(1 +
@
@ti
)

@2
@t2i
:
At this stage we cannot say that condition (C4) is su¢ cient because the sign
of h(i) :=

(Ki   i K)f ikk   tii KKi (1 +
@
@ti
)

is not determined a priori when
i 6= 0 whereas it is negative when i = 0. By continuity of the function h(:) we
can say that for a su¢ ciently small i, h(i) is negative, and therefore Corollary
1 remains true6.
As a corollary we have.
6Note that the derivative of function h: hk(i) =   KKi f ikk @Pi@ti is positive in the neighbourhood
of the optimal tax rate, whereas nothing can be said a priori about the level of h(1) = f ikk(Ki 
K
Ki
@Pi
@ti
).
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Corollary 3 Assume that consumers preferences are represented by twice-
continuously di¤erentiable, monotonously increasing utility functions Ui(:; :) in
(Xi; Pi), that conditions (C1), (C2), (C3), and (C4) are satised, and that i is
su¢ ciently small. If for each jurisdiction i, the production function fi 2 {Cobb-
Douglass, Quadratic, Logarithmic and Exponential, Logistic, CES}, under further
conditions on the parameters for the logistic and CES production functions, then
the scal game possesses a Nash equilibrium.
The particular case of symmetric jurisdictions enables us to obtain a clear
result:
Corollary 4 In the particular case of symmetric jurisdictions with i = 1n for
all i, if conditions (C1), (C2), (C3), and (C4) are satised, then the scal game
possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Recall h(i) :=

(Ki   i K)f ikk   tii KKi (1 +
@
@ti
)

, then h( 1
n
) =
  tii K
Ki
(1 + @
@ti
) < 0 which completes the proof.
Corollary 2 can be compared to the Bayindir-Upmann & Ziads result
whereas Corollary 4 generalizes the Bayindir-Upmann & Ziads result. Indeed, we
focus on a global Nash equilibrium (that is any unilateral deviation (small or not)
is not protable) whereas the Nash equilibrium analyzed by Bayindir-Upmann
& Ziad remains local. Moreover, in their paper, n = 2 constitutes a su¢ cient
condition which allows the authors to prove the existence of a local Nash equi-
librium for symmetric jurisdictions. In our paper, apart from conditions that are
also used in Bayindir-Upmann and Ziad (C1 and C2) our result arises from two
crucial conditions: the demand for capital is concave, and the elasticity of the
marginal product of capital is bounded. Once these conditions are checked, our
result is still available for more than two jurisdictions.
4 Conclusion
In this methodological paper we have determined conditions that enable the ex-
istence of a Nash equilibrium in a standard tax competition game. When there
are no capital owners in the Nation, our result is general and simple to apply.
Indeed, some di¤erent examples with standard production functions show that
our method is tractable. For the case of resident owners, we are able to state
that a Nash equilibrium exists for the particular case of capital equally owned
among jurisdictions. Our result extend the existing literature by considering more
than two jurisdictions and assuming that these jurisdictions may have asymmet-
ric production functions. A further step for this analysis would be to concentrate
on the uniqueness of the equilibrium in such a general framework. This would
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be a challenging task. In parallel, a secondary objective is to conduct the same
exercise (proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium) in a model of trade with
interactions between scal policies "à la Turnovsky" (1988). Our nal objective
is to combine both frameworks which would form a further interesting challenge.
In addition, this framework will enable us to test the impact of trade upon pub-
lic good provision in a tax competition model. A initial result of this ongoing
work shows that the underprovision of the public good is reduced when a trade
channel is introduced into the tax competition model. Our intuition is that an
optimal public good provision may be restored in a general model for which many
interdependent channels of scal policies transmission coexist.
5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1: Proof of lemma 5
@Ki(t)
@ti
=

1 + @(t)
@ti

f ikk
The second derivative is:
@2Ki(t)
@t2i
=

@2(t)
@t2i

f ikk  

1 + @(t)
@ti

@Ki(t)
@ti
f ikkk
(f ikk)
2
:
replacing @Ki(t)
@ti
=

1+
@(t)
@ti

f ikk
, we obtain
@2Ki(t)
@t2i
=

@2(t)
@t2i

(f ikk)
2  

1 + @(t)
@ti
2
f ikkk
(f ikk)
3
:
From lemma 4,

@2(t)
@ti

(f ikk)
2 =

1 + @(t)
@ti

f ikkk
f ikk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
  f ikk @(t)@ti
P
j 6=i
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3
(
P
j
1
fjkk
)2
:
And 
1 +
@(t)
@ti
2
f ikkk =
f ikkk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
P
j
1
fjkk
2 :
Replacing

1 + @(t)
@ti

=
P
j 6=i
1
f
j
kkP
j
1
f
j
kk
and @(t)
@ti
=
 1
fi
kkP
j
1
f
j
kk
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
@2(t)
@ti

(f ikk)
2  

1 +
@(t)
@ti
2
f ikkk =
P
j 6=i
1
f
j
kkP
j
1
f
j
kk
f ikkk
f ikk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
  f ikk
 1
fi
kkP
j
1
f
j
kk
P
j 6=i
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3P
j
1
fjkk
2   f ikkk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
P
j
1
fjkk
2 =
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
:f ikkk + f
i
kk
P
j 6=i
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3
  f ikkkf ikk
P
j
1
fjkk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
P
j
1
fjkk
3
:f ikk
:
Finally
@2Ki(t)
@t2i
=
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
:f ikkk + f
i
kk
P
j 6=i
fjkkk
(fjkk)
3
  f ikkkf ikk
P
j
1
fjkk
P
j 6=i
1
fjkk
2
P
j
1
fjkk
3
:(f ikk)
4
:
5.2 Appendix 2: Proof of Corollary 2
From Lemma 7 we know that there exists a symmetrical prole (t,t,....t) such
that the rst derivative of the utility function disappears. Let us examine the
second derivative at (t,t,....t) in two cases: n = 2 and n  3
1. Symmetric case with n = 2
@
@ti
 
@Xi
@ti
@Pi
@ti
!
< 0
, @
2Xi
@t2i
@Pi
@ti
  @Xi
@ti
@2Pi
@t2i
< 0 (19)
 We know that @Xi
@ti
< 0, and @Pi
@ti
> 0 in the neighborhood of any interior
extremum point.
Let @
2Pi
@t2i
= 2@Ki
@ti
+ti
@2Ki
@t2i
, and from Lemma 6, @
2Ki
@t2i
= 0 which implies @
2Pi
@t2i
< 0.
Then @
2Xi
@t2i
< 0 is a su¢ cient condition to reach the inequality (19)
@2Xi
@t2i
=  1
4
 
1
f ikk
+Ki
f ikkk
(f ikk)
2
!
< 0
() f ikk +Kif ikkk > 0
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 If f ikk +Kif ikkk < 0, (19) writes
@2Xi
@t2i
@Pi
@ti
  @Xi
@ti
@2Pi
@t2i
=  1
4
 
1
f ikk
+Ki
f ikkk
(f ikk)
2
!
Ki+
1
2
ti
1
f ikk

+
1
2
Ki
1
f ikk
< 0
()
2
 
f ikk  Kif ikkk

<
 
f ikk +Kif
i
kkk
 1
Ki
ti
1
f ikk
Since the left-hand side of the last inequality is negative, (19) is always
checked with f ikk+Kif
i
kkk < 0 since it implies a positive right-hand side
2. For n  3, in the symmetric case (fi = fj = f), an evaluation on the
extremum point given in Lemma 7 gives:
1 +
@
@ti
= 1  1
n
=
n  1
n
@2
@t2i
=
n  1
n2
f ikkk
(f ikk)
2
The inequality became:
ti(fkk +Kifkkk)

n  1
n
3
< Ki(fkk)
2
 
n  1
n
2
  n  1
n2
Kifkkk
fkk
!
:
A su¢ cient condition for the last inequality (knowing that ti  fk(Ki)) is :
fk(Ki)(fkk +Kifkkk)

n  1
n
3
< Ki(fkk)
2
 
n  1
n
2
  n  1
n2
Kifkkk
fkk
!
;
which is equivalent to
fk(Ki)(fkk +Kifkkk)
Ki(fkk)2

n  1
n
3
<
 
n  1
n
2
  n  1
n2
Kifkkk
fkk
!
:
:
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